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Do Financial Incentives affect the Quality of Expert Performance?
Evidence from the Racetrack
Abstract
Does the quality of performance by experts respond to financial incentives? Or, as some
psychologists argue, are experts primarily motivated by more intrinsic considerations
such as professional pride? I provide some evidence on this question by examining the
relationship between horse race outcomes and the level of race prize money.  If financial
incentives are important, then  races with low prize money are more likely to see some
trainers exert less than full effort, thereby upsetting the calculations of race bettors.  By
contrast, races with high prize money are less likely to be affected by unobservable
variation in trainer effort, so bettor odds should then be a more reliable predictor of race
outcomes.  In a sample of 30426 horse races, I find evidence consistent with this story:
average bettor payoffs in a variety of betting pools are strongly negatively related to race
prize money, and the probability of a bettor-favourite horse succeeding is strictly
increasing in the amount of prize money at stake.  These results continue to hold when I
exclude low-information races from the sample, thereby suggesting that prize money is
not acting as a proxy for the quantity of information publicly available to bettors.  As a
group, horse trainers apparently tailor the quality of their performance to the potential size
of their payout from clients.
1Do Financial Incentives affect the Quality of Expert Performance?
Evidence from the Racetrack
1.  Introduction
A number of recent studies document a strong output response to the provision of financial incentives
for workers.  For example, Lazear (2000), Paarsch and Shearer (2000), and Shearer (2004) all find
that productivity is significantly greater when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages.
This evidence suggests that the potential for greater financial returns motivates greater effort and
hence enhances performance quantity, just as economic theory predicts.
By contrast, there is considerably more doubt about the sensitivity of performance quality to
incentives - the extent to which greater payoffs motivate workers to produce better, as well as more,
goods and services.  Psychologists such as Kohn (1993a, 1993b) reject the idea that money can
motivate quality-oriented tasks, a view generally supported by laboratory evidence: in a meta-analysis
of 39 experiments undertaken between 1975 and 1996, Jenkins et al (1998) are unable to detect any
significant relationship between financial incentives and performance quality.1
The relationship between performance quality and financial incentives is particularly germane
to the class of professional workers who use specialized knowledge, information and skills to provide
quality-oriented expert services to clients. Because the actions undertaken by these experts are often
difficult to observe and monitor, they can potentially tailor their effort to the magnitude of the potential
payoff.  For example, financial advisor firms often receive fees based on the value of client
portfolios, and so have a strong incentive to devote more care and attention to high-wealth clients than
to those of lesser means.  Similarly, a law firm stands to gain more from a class-action lawsuit filed
against a defendant with deep pockets than from a case involving a single client who wishes to
dispute a parking ticket - strict financial considerations would suggest that the quality of
representation is therefore likely to be higher in the former case. However, experts are typically
members of a profession and thus are likely to have high intrinsic motivation related to this
membership; such "professional pride" considerations should encourage experts to treat all clients
equally and thus dampen the impact of financial incentives on performance quality.
Because data on expert performance and payoffs are frequently unavailable and, in the case of
performance, often difficult to measure as well, empirical evidence on the economic behaviour of
experts is limited to just a few studies.  Levitt and Syverson (2005) and Rutherford et al (2005) find
that real estate agents perform better when selling their own houses than when selling on behalf of
1 Bonner et al (2000) and Camerer and Hogarth (1999) report broadly similar findings.
2clients, but Gompers and Lerner (1999) report no difference between the secondary market
performance of initial public offerings underwritten by affiliated banks and those underwritten by
independent banks.  Gruber and Owings (1996), Croxson et al (2001) and Gaynor et al (2004) also
document examples of health professionals responding to financial incentives, although these relate
more to the quantity and type of services provided rather than the overall quality of performance.
Finally, Hubbard (1998) finds that auto mechanics in private firms adopt a more lenient emissions test
policy than do government-employed inspectors, a finding he attributes to a desire for repeat business
by the former group. Although these studies suggest that experts may tailor their performance to the
potential size of the payoff they receive, and that they sometimes favour their own financial interests
over those of clients, it remains uncertain whether they also serve their own interests by favouring
some clients over others.
 A setting that is potentially capable of providing evidence on this issue is the training of race
horses.  Trainers are experts who prepare horses for racing on behalf of clients, and in return receive
daily fees plus a percentage of horse winnings (10% in the setting examined here).  Because 10% of
high winnings is worth more to trainers than 10% of low winnings, they have a financial incentive to
provide better quality training services to clients whose horses compete in races that offer the greatest
stakes.  And, unlike most other experts, the results (race outcomes) and potential payoffs (race
stakes) of trainer endeavour are both extensive and publicly available.
If trainers are motivated by financial considerations, then they can be expected to work harder
and smarter leading up to races that offer high stakes.  But if they are motivated by professional pride
considerations, then they should exert the same "effort" for all races.  However, the tournament
nature of race outcomes creates a significant difficulty in trying to distinguish between these two
hypotheses: even if all trainers try harder and provide higher-quality service in preparing their horses
for a high-stakes race, only one horse can win that race.
One way around this problem is to use an absolute measure of performance such as the time
taken to run a particular distance, i.e., if trainers provide better quality effort in preparing for high-
stakes races, then a given horse should run faster in such a race than in another race where the prize
money is lower.  However, the sensitivity of race times to weather, track surface, and particularly,
race tactics, means that such an approach is unlikely to be useful.
An alternative solution is to use the information contained in race betting odds in order to
indirectly infer the relationship between race stakes and trainer performance quality. In handicapping
any race, the betting public uses a vast array of information: expert opinion and advice, perceived
horse quality based on prior performance, trainer quality, driver quality, barrier draw, and so on.
3Most studies of racetrack betting conclude that markets are broadly efficient with respect to such
publicly-available information (for overviews, see Hausch et al, 1994, and Sauer, 1998), but various
anomalies suggest that private information may not be fully incorporated in odds (e.g., Crafts, 1985;
Gabriel and Marsden, 1990; Shin, 1993).  In this context, a particularly important piece of private
information is the extent to which a horse's trainer exerts maximum effort in preparing it for that race.
A trainer might, for example, under-work a horse in the days leading up to the race, or entrust the
horse's care to a junior stablehand, or obtain the services of a lower-quality raceday driver or jockey.
In general, such "inside information" is unobservable to bettors, and so little of it is impounded in
betting odds.2
Why might a trainer exert less-than-full effort? In addition to the usual argument that effort is
costly in terms of foregone leisure, three other possibilities stand out.  First, the trainer may have
other horses under his care and so must allocate his available time among these competing interests.
Second, the trainer may be focussing on more valuable future races for the same horse and is thus
using the current race largely as a practice run.  Third, there may be simple corruption motivations.
For example, the trainer intends to bet on another trainer's horse in the same race and so wishes to
maximise the probability of that bet succeeding by making his own horse less of a factor.  Or he
hopes to reap a large betting payoff on the horse in a future race by first improving its odds with a
lacklustre performance in the current race.3  Regardless of which of these motivations applies in any
particular case, all should diminish in intensity as race stakes become higher: the opportunity cost of
leisure increases, the opportunity cost of devoting time to other horses and races increases, and the
risk of incurring corruption penalties becomes more difficult to justify.
Suppose that trainers are indeed more likely to choose lower effort levels in low-stakes races,
and that this choice is unobservable to bettors.  Then bettor odds - which primarily reflect publicly
available information - will be a less reliable predictor of the outcomes of such races, since bettors are
missing relevant information.  By contrast, private information is less significant in high-stakes races
where all trainers exert full effort, hence ensuring a closer convergence between bettor odds and race
outcomes.  In short, race outcomes become more "predictable" to bettors (given the information they
have available) as race stakes increase, and favoured horses - which offer smaller bettor payoffs -
succeed more often.
2 Of course, insiders (employees and other connections of the trainer's stable) will often have this information and can be
expected to utilise it.  However, such investments are typically only a small proportion of the total amount bet - Coleman
(2007) estimates approximately 2% - and, as previous studies indicate, do not seem to be sufficient to fully incorporate the
information in betting odds.
3 Shin (1992) cites an acknowledgement by United Kingdom racing officials of the prevalence of this practice.
4This situation is depicted in Figure 1.  The two circles represent the total amounts of
information relevant to predicting the outcome of low- and high-stakes races respectively.  In the low
stakes race, some trainers exert less-than-full effort because of preferred opportunities elsewhere, and
so a relatively large proportion of the relevant information is unavailable to bettors.  As a result, some
horses will be over-bet and others under-bet, and unexpected outcomes (i.e., high payoffs to
successful bettors) will be relatively common.  But in the high-stakes race, all trainers do their best,
so the quantity of private information is relatively small.  Bettor odds thus reflect a greater proportion
of the relevant information and unexpected race outcomes are less common.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
To explore this idea, I test the following two hypotheses: if horse trainers respond to financial
incentives by exerting greater effort in races with high stakes, then (i) the size of the payoffs (per unit
of investment) received by successful bettors should decrease in race stakes, and (ii) the success rate
of betting "favourites" (i.e., the horses with the most bettor money invested on them) should increase
in race stakes.  Put more succinctly, horses that are relatively heavily backed by bettors, and thus
offer lower payoffs, should succeed more often in high-stakes races.
In a sample of 30426 horse races, I detect a strong relationship between race stakes and
payoffs to successful bettors: after controlling for other factors that might affect race outcomes, a
doubling of the race stake is associated with a decrease in bettor payoffs of between 8% and 14%,
depending on the betting pool.  Similarly, the success rates of bettor-favourite horses increase
significantly with the size of the race stake.  Importantly, I obtain essentially the same results in sub-
samples that exclude races about which bettors seem likely to have relatively little information,
thereby suggesting that race stake is not simply proxying for the quantity and quality of bettor
information about a race.  As a group, horse trainers apparently tailor the quality of their performance
to the potential size of their financial payoff.
In the next section, I describe the data used in this paper and undertake some preliminary
analysis.  Section 3 contains the results from a series of multiple regression models that are the
paper's primary focus.  Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.         
              
2.  Data and Preliminary Analysis
My data sample consists of 30426 standardbred (harness) horse races contested in New
Zealand (NZ) between 1993 and 2006 for which full data are available.4  These races were staged at
4 A further 330 races had missing or non-existent data, and so were deleted from the sample.
556 distinct tracks spread across the entire length of NZ, but with more than a third of them taking
place at the two major tracks located in Auckland and Christchurch.  Since 1996, NZ has had both
fixed-odds (bookmaker) and totalisator (pari-mutuel) options available, although most betting takes
place via the latter. Total betting on the races in my sample was approximately $3.5 billion.
For each race, I recorded both the total prizemoney at stake and the payoffs to successful
investors in three totalisator betting pools: win, quinella and trifecta.  The win pool requires bettors to
select the winning horse; the quinella pool requires selection of the first and second horses in either
order; the trifecta pool requires selection of the first three horses in the correct order.  Moving from
win to quinella to trifecta payoffs yields an increasingly broad measure of the extent to which a race
corresponds to bettors' expectations.  For example, a strongly favoured horse could win the race and
yield a small win pool payoff - indicating that the result was highly predictable - but be followed
home by two outsiders resulting in a large trifecta pool payoff - indicating that the result was
unexpected.  By using all three payoff measures, I am able to better assess whether the hypothesized
relationship between betting payoffs and race stakes is robust.  I also recorded the success of the
betting favourite (i.e., the horse that attracted the most investment) in two pools: win and place.  The
win favourite was deemed to be successful if and only if it won; the place favourite was successful if
and only if it finished in the first three.5
Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the variables used in this study.  Betting payoffs
are expressed relative to a $1 unit of investment, i.e., a $10 payoff equals $1 return of investment
plus $9 winnings.6  The three payoff variables display considerable dispersion, e.g., the mean trifecta
payoff is $1055, but the sample contains payoffs ranging from $2.10 to almost $400,000.  Race
stakes are similarly variable: the mean stake is $8019, but individual stakes range from $1000 to
$750,000.  All four variables exhibit significant skewness, with means that are considerably greater
than medians.7  Win favourites win approximately one third of all races, while place favourites
successfully finish in the first three 61% of the time.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
To investigate the relation between race stakes and betting payoffs (or favourite success rates),
I control for variables that potentially affect the payoff measures I use.  An obvious candidate here is
the number of horses in the race, since a bigger field makes it less likely that any given horse - or
5 Note that betting terminology varies across countries. In the United States, for example, a place bet requires a horse to finish
in the first two, while an investment that requires finishing in the first three (i.e., a NZ place bet) is known as a show bet.
6 All monetary values are in New Zealand dollars.
7 The Totalisator Agency Board (the sole agency for betting on horse races in NZ) guarantees a minimum payoff of $1.
6combination of horses - will succeed.  All else equal, this should have a significant impact on average
payoffs, particularly in the quinella and trifecta pools.8
I also control for the inherent "unpredictability" of a race.  Regardless of stake, some races are
simply more difficult to handicap than others, resulting in a greater number of unexpected outcomes
that are associated with lower favourite success rates and higher betting payoffs.  For standardbred
horse races, three factors stand out.  First, although most races in my sample are run on all-weather
surfaces, a significant minority (approximately 12.5%) are run on grass.  Grass track races are often
more difficult to handicap for several reasons: horses are less experienced at racing on grass, bettors
have less information about horses' relative prowess on grass, and grass tracks offer a less
homogeneous racing surface that may randomly affect some horses in any race.  Second,
approximately 10% of the races in the sample are run on rain-affected tracks.  This affects different
horses in different ways, but tends to neutralise the advantages of high-speed horses, thus making the
outcome more difficult for bettors to predict.  Third, although the majority of races in my data begin
from a mobile dispatch (where the horses are already moving at close to race speed at the point where
the race starts), approximately 44% are standing start races (where the horses must stand quietly and
begin from a stationary position).  The latter feature introduces an additional random element because
horses are more likely to deviate from the correct gait (i.e., racing action) when forced to begin
quickly from a stationary position, potentially resulting in considerable loss of ground or
disqualification.
To quantify these features in a form amenable to empirical analysis, I construct an index that
adds 1 for each of the above features that a race possesses.9  For example, a race that is run on a wet
grass surface from a standing start has an index value of 3, while a race that is run on a dry grass
surface from a mobile start is given an index value of 1.  Races with none of these features have an
index value of 0.
Table 2 provides some preliminary analysis of the relation between race stakes and betting
payoffs.  I first split the sample into races above and below the median stake and calculate average
betting payoffs and favourite success rates for each group.  Average payoffs are lower, and favourite
success rates are higher, in higher-stakes races, and these differences are strongly statistically
significant (at the 0.1% level or better).  Quantitatively, the differences are greatest in the more exotic
8 For example, increasing the number of horses in the race from 10 to 12 raises the number of possible quinella combinations
from 45 to 66, and the number of possible trifecta combinations from 720 to 1320. In my sample, 70% of the races contain
between 9 and 14 horses, but as Table 1 indicates, some take on more extreme values.
9 I also estimated models that include these three features as separate variables.  However, this has no noticeable effect on the
race stake coefficient, so I report only the results from the more parsimonious models that include the index as an explanatory
variable.
7bet pools - the average trifecta dividend in races with stakes above the sample median is only 82% of
the average dividend in races with stakes below the sample median.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
I also calculate the correlation between, on the one hand, the race stake, and on the other
hand, the payoff and success rate variables.  Partly to eliminate the skewness, and partly because any
impact of stakes on betting payoff seems likely to be non-linear, I use the natural log of the race stake
and bettor payoff variables for this purpose.  As the last column of Table 2 reveals, race stakes are
strongly negatively correlated with bettor payoffs and positively correlated with favourite success
rates (again at the 0.1% level or better).
At the same time, however, both field size and race unpredictability are (i) greater on average
in the low-stakes races, and (ii) negatively correlated with race stakes.  Thus, although the above
results yield the conclusion that betting payoffs are negatively related to race stakes, consistent with
the view that bigger financial incentives induce greater effort and better performance from trainers,
this relationship could be due to the negative relation between stakes and the two control variables.
To disentangle these effects, I employ multivariate regressions that allow me to estimate the relation
between race outcomes and stakes while controlling for these other factors.
3.  Regression Analysis
I estimate regression models of the general form
y = !0 + !1(ln race stake) + !2(field size) + !3(unpredictability index) + "!!!!!(1)
In some specifications, the dependent variable y equals the natural log of one of the three betting
payoff variables.  In other specifications, y is an indicator variable: either (i) set equal to 1 if the win
pool favourite wins and 0 otherwise, or (ii) set equal to 1 if the place pool favourite finishes in the
first three and 0 otherwise.  The first set of models are estimated by ordinary least squares with White
(1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; the second set of models are estimated using
maximum-likelihood logit regression.
I also estimate an extension of (1) that incorporates fixed effects for each race track. Some
tracks may be configured in such a way (e.g., smaller, with tighter and less contoured bends) that
racing luck is more important at those venues, thereby resulting in a greater number of unexpected
outcomes and higher average betting payoffs.  To the extent that such a phenomenon is more likely to
8arise on tracks used by small racing clubs that primarily run low-stakes races, the estimated
coefficient on race stake will be upwardly biased.  To alleviate this problem, I include a dummy
variable for each of the 26 tracks on which at least 150 races were held over the sample period.
3.1  Full-sample results
I initially estimate (1) using the full sample of 30426 races and present the results in Tables 3
and 4.  Table 3 summarises the results of regressions that use one of the three betting payoff
measures as the dependent variable, while Table 4 focuses on the favourite-success indicator
variables.
Table 3 shows that there is a strong negative relation between race stakes and bettor payoffs.
On average, a doubling of the race stake is associated with an 8.2% decrease in the win payoff, a
9.8% decrease in the quinella payoff, and a 13.8% decrease in the trifecta payoff.  Allowing for
fixed-track effects reduces the magnitude of these relationships, but the change is minor (the fixed-
effect elasticities are approximately 90% of those described above).  And regardless of model
specification, the estimated relationship is statistically significant at the 0.1% level.
One way of assessing the economic significance of these results is to estimate the predicted
dollar impact on bettor payoffs of going from a low-stakes to a high-stakes race, holding all else
equal. Specifically, I set the control variables equal to their respective sample means and then allow
the race stake to go from its 20th percentile value to its 80th (approximately a 90% rise in stake).  As
shown in the last row of Table 3, this lowers the predicted win payoff by $0.35, the quinella payoff
by $1.45, and the trifecta payoff by $29.05 (approximately 6%, 7% and 10% of their respective
sample medians).  Allowing for fixed-track effects results in slightly smaller impacts.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
As expected, the control variables have a strongly positive impact on bettor payoffs, with all
coefficients being significant at the 0.1% level.  Reflecting the idiosyncratic nature of bets that rely on
the success of a single horse, the explanatory power of the model is greater for the more exotic bets:
the R2 for the trifecta payoff is 0.22, but this falls to 0.07 for the win payoff.
Table 4 shows that there is also a significant positive relation between the probability of
favoured horse success and race stake: the win pool favourite has an approximately 5.5% greater
chance of succeeding in a race in the 80th stake percentile than in a race in the 20th stake percentile;
for the place pool favourite, the corresponding margin is approximately 2.5%.  Again, these estimated
relationships are statistically significant at the 0.1% level, with and without track fixed effects.
9[Insert Table 4 about here]
3.2  Do the full-sample results indicate that high-stakes races induce more effort from trainers,
or just that high-stakes races provide more information for bettors?
The results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with the view that financial incentives matter for
experts such as horse trainers: a high race stake induces more trainers to exert full effort in preparing
their horses, thereby making the information possessed by bettors more useful in handicapping the
race, and hence, all else equal, making it more likely that bettor-favoured horses will succeed.
However, there is an obvious alternative explanation for Tables 3 and 4: a race with a high stake may
be one in which bettors have more information about the abilities of the horses involved, and hence
they are better able to handicap such a race.  According to this view, races with high stakes are also
races in which bettors are better informed, so any relation between race stakes and the success of
bettor-favoured horses may simply reflect this information effect, and have nothing to do with trainer
responses to financial incentives.
Bettors may have more and better information in a high-stakes race for at least two reasons.
First, such races are typically restricted to more experienced horses (since qualification requires some
minimum level of prior performance) who have a longer racing history and hence offer more
information about their abilities to bettors.  Second, racing media coverage is often greater for higher-
stakes races, particularly when these are held in major population centres.
I attempt to control for bettor information effects by re-estimating equation (1) using sub-
samples that increasingly eliminate low-information races.  First, I exclude all races that were
restricted to, or were primarily designed for, horses that had previously won no more than one race.
This reduces the sample to 8133 races.  Second, I also exclude all races that were restricted to two
year old horses and those that were held outside the two principal race tracks in Auckland and
Christchurch.  This results in a total of 3368 races.  In this way, I restrict the sample to just those
races involving experienced horses at meetings receiving the most extensive media coverage.
Variation in the amount of information available to bettors should be minor in these races.
Tables 5 and 6 contain the results from estimating (1) using these sub-samples.  If anything,
the relationship between race stake and realised bettor payoffs (Table 5) is even stronger than in the
full sample: for example, a doubling of the race stake is now associated with a 19% decrease in the
trifecta payoff, compared with 14% in the full sample.  The relation between race stakes and bettor-
favourite success (Table 6) is similarly affected: the estimated coefficients are all 50-100% greater
10
than in the full-sample results of Table 4.  And although the standard errors are also bigger, all
coefficient estimates for the stake variable remain significant at the 0.1% level.  Thus, it seems
unlikely that my earlier results are due to unobserved differences in the information available to
bettors.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
         
4.  Concluding Remarks
On the one hand, experts can be expected to advance their own financial interests by, for
example, favouring their most profitable clients.  On the other hand, experts are more likely than other
workers to be subject to professional pride considerations that motivate them to treat all clients
equally.  However, very little is known about the way in which experts trade off these competing
incentives.  In this paper, I show that racehorse trainers appear to favour clients whose horses
compete in high-stakes races: such races are characterised by lower average returns to successful
bettors than low-stakes races, consistent with trainers uniformly exerting full effort in the former but
not the latter.
Such behaviour is not necessarily contrary to the wishes of clients: some owners of horses
that race for low stakes may tolerate a lower level of service today in the expectation that they will be
favoured when and if they come to own a horse that races for high stakes.  Nevertheless, my findings
support earlier results from real estate agents (Levitt and Syverson, 2005; Rutherford et al, 2005) and
auto mechanics (Hubbard,1998) which suggest that the financial incentives facing experts dominate
the intrinsic incentives, contrary to the views of some psychologists (e.g., Kohn, 1993a, 1993b).  It
would of course be interesting to discover whether such dominance extends to more "upscale" expert
professions such as lawyers, physicians/surgeons, dentists and accountants.
Finally, the results of this paper may also have implications for the literature on the efficiency
of horse race betting markets.  In a study of United Kingdom thoroughbred racing, Vaughan
Williams and Paton (1997) find little evidence of betting inefficiency in high-quality races - which
presumably offer relatively high stakes - but stronger evidence in other races.  Those authors suggest
that this difference is due to there being greater media coverage of high-quality races, but my results
imply another possibility - that high-quality races induce full effort from all trainers and hence
eliminate unobservable variation in trainer effort as a source of bettor error.
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Figure 1
Proportion of Information Available to Bettors if Trainer Effort Depends on
Race Stake
In the low stakes race, some trainers exert less-than-full effort because of better opportunities
elsewhere, and so a relatively large proportion of the relevant information is unavailable to
bettors. As a result, some horses will be over-bet and others under-bet, and unexpected race
outcomes will be relatively common.  But in the high-stakes race, all trainers do their best, so
the quantity of private information is relatively small.  Bettor odds thus incorporate a greater
proportion of the relevant information and unexpected race outcomes are less common.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
All data are from 30426 harness horse races run in New Zealand between 1992 and 2006.
Race Stake is the total race prize money paid to the owners of successful horses. Win Payoff is
the return to bettors who select the winning horse.  Quinella Payoff is the return to bettors who
select the first two horses home (in either order). Trifecta Payoff is the return to bettors who
select the first three horses home (in finishing order).  All payoffs are based on a $1 unit of
investment.  Field Size is the number of horses in the race.  Unpredictability Index ranges from
0 to 3 and is formed by adding 1 if the race is (i) run on grass, (ii) begun from a standing start,
(iii) adversely affected by the weather. Win Favourite Success is equal to one if the favoured
horse in the win betting pool wins and zero otherwise. Place Favourite Success is equal to one
if the favoured horse in the place betting pool finishes in the first three and zero otherwise.
Mean Min Median Max
(standard deviation)
Race Stake ($) 8019 1000 5000 750000
(15454)
Win Payoff ($) 8.60 1.00 5.45 173.70
(9.71)
Quinella Payoff ($) 44.65 1.05 21.30 2103.35
(72.89)
Trifecta Payoff ($) 1055.00 2.10 307.50 398606
(4023.36)
Field Size 11.73 4 12 18
(2.32)
Unpredictability 0.672 0 1 3
Index (0.71)
Win Favourite 0.335 - - -
Success (0.002)
Place Favourite 0.610 - - -
Success (0.003)
Table 2
Preliminary Analysis
All data are from 30426 harness horse races run in New Zealand between 1992 and 2006.  All
variables are defined in Table 1.  The first column of numbers calculates the mean of each
variable for races offering stakes above the sample median; the second column calculates the
mean of each variable for races offering stakes below the sample median; the third presents the
difference between the first two columns.  The fourth column gives the correlation between
each variable (or its natural log in the case of the three payoff variables) and the natural log of
race stake.  All estimates in the last two columns are significantly different from zero at the
0.1% level.
Races with above- Races with below-   Difference Correlation
median stake median stake with Race
Stake
Average Win 8.28 8.93 -0.65 -0.25
Payoff ($)
Average Quinella 42.13 47.15 -5.02 -0.27
Payoff ($)
Average Trifecta 951.51 1157.92 -206.41 -0.31
Payoff ($)
Average Field Size 11.45 12.00 -0.55 -0.29
Unpredictability 0.619 0.725 -0.11 -0.26
Index Average
Win Favourite 0.347 0.322 0.025 0.15
Success Rate
Place Favourite 0.625 0.596 0.029 0.13
Success Rate
Table 3
Regressions of Betting Payoffs on Race Stakes: Full Sample
The dependent variables are the natural log of the payoffs (based on a $1 unit of investment) to successful bettors in three betting pools run
on 30426 harness horse races run in New Zealand between 1992 and 2006.  Field Size is the number of horses in the race.  Unpredictability
Index ranges from 0 to 3 and is formed by adding 1 if the race is (i) run on grass, (ii) begun from a standing start, (iii) adversely affected by
the weather.  Ln Race Stake is the natural log of total race prize money.  The regressions with fixed-track effects include 26 dummy variables,
one for each of the race tracks at which at least 150 races were held during the sample period.  Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors
are in parentheses; all coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level.  The final row calculates the predicted
impact on betting payoffs of going from the 20th stake percentile to the 80th.
Dependent Variable
Win Win Quinella Quinella Trifecta Trifecta
Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff
Intercept 1.446 1.453 1.869 1.806 3.581 3.513
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
Field Size 0.084 0.083 0.174 0.176 0.283 0.286
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unpredictability 0.064 0.057 0.091 0.098 0.122 0.127
Index (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ln Race Stake -0.082 -0.075 -0.098 -0.089 -0.138 -0.124
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
R2 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.22
Fixed-Track Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Predicted impact of going
from the 20th stake -$0.35 -$0.25 -$1.45 -$1.35 -$29.05 -$26.40
percentile to the 80th
Table 4
Logit Regressions of Betting-Favourite Success Rates on Race Stakes: Full Sample
All data are from 30426 harness horse races run in New Zealand between 1992 and 2006.  The dependent variable is either (i) equal to one if
the favoured horse in the win betting pool wins and zero otherwise (Win Favourite Success) or (ii) equal to one if the favoured horse in the
place betting pool finishes in the first three and zero otherwise (Place Favourite Success). All explanatory variables are described in Table 3.
All models are logit regressions. The regressions with fixed-track effects include 26 dummy variables, one for each of the race tracks at
which at least 150 races were held during the sample period.  Standard errors are in parentheses; all coefficient estimates are significantly
different from zero at the 0.1% level.  The final row calculates the predicted effect of going from the 20th stake percentile to the 80th
percentile on the probability of the favourite succeeding.
Dependent Variable
Win Favourite Win Favourite Place Favourite Place Favourite
Success Success Success Success
Intercept -0.809 -0.907 1.036 1.098
(0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22)
Field Size -0.080 -0.077 -0.116 -0.117
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unpredictability -0.133 -0.100 -0.137 -0.140
Index (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ln Race Stake 0.131 0.120 0.101 0.091
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Pseudo-R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Fixed-Track Effects No Yes No Yes
Predicted impact of going
from the 20th stake 5.80% 5.31% 2.55% 2.30%
percentile to the 80th
Table 5
Regressions of Betting Payoffs on Race Stakes: Sub-samples
This table estimates the relationship between betting payoffs and race stakes for two sub-samples that are increasingly restricted to races
involving experienced horses for whom considerable information is available to the betting public.  Sub-sample A excludes all races restricted
to horses that have previously won no more than one race; sub-sample B also excludes all races for two year-old horses and all races
conducted outside the two major metropolitan tracks located in Auckland and Christchurch.  All variables are defined in Table 3.
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses; all coefficient estimates except those marked with a '^' are significantly
different from zero at the 0.1% level.  The final row calculates the predicted impact on betting payoffs of going from the 20th stake percentile
to the 80th.
Sub-sample A (n = 8132)   Sub-sample B (n = 3368)
Dependent Variable
Win Quinella Trifecta Win Quinella Trifecta
Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff
Intercept 1.575 2.144 3.818 1.722 2.022 3.938
(0.14) (0.18) (0.23) (0.21) (0.27) (0.32)
Field Size 0.095 0.188 0.311 0.091 0.180 0.300
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Unpredictability 0.079 0.113 0.139 0.068^ 0.151 0.162
Index (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Ln Race Stake -0.107 -0.141 -0.191 -0.118 -0.119 -0.190
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.07 0.15 0.24
Predicted impact of going
from the 20th stake -$0.45 -$2.25 -$40.85 -$0.55 -$2.15 -$43.90
percentile to the 80th
Table 6
Logit Regressions of Betting-Favourite Success Rates on Race Stakes: Sub-samples
This table estimates the relationship between favourite-horse success rates and race stakes for two sub-samples that are increasingly restricted
to races involving experienced horses for whom considerable information is available to the betting public.  Sub-sample A excludes all races
restricted to horses that have previously won no more than one race; sub-sample B also excludes all races for two year-old horses and all
races conducted outside the two major metropolitan tracks located in Auckland and Christchurch.  All variables are defined in Table 4. All
models are logit regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses; all coefficient estimates except those marked with a '^' are significantly
different from zero at the 0.1% level.  The final row calculates the predicted effect of going from the 20th stake percentile to the 80th
percentile on the probability of the favourite succeeding.
Sub-sample A (n = 8132) Sub-sample B (n = 3368)
Dependent Variable
Win Favourite Win Favourite Place Favourite Place Favourite
Success Success Success Success
Intercept -1.089 0.391^ -1.232^ -0.147^
(0.34) (0.36) (0.50) (0.52)
Field Size -0.100 -0.129 -0.078 -0.106
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Unpredictability -0.149 -0.175 -0.088^ -0.237
Index (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Ln Race Stake 0.183 0.185 0.169 0.217
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Pseudo-R2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Predicted impact of going
from the 20th stake 9.82% 5.55% 10.56% 7.46%
percentile to the 80th
